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Abstract 
This paper discusses the findings of a research project which explored the impact of 
varying organisational arrangements on drinking water quality in England and Wales, 
and the Republic of Ireland. It is established that drinking water quality has been of a 
consistently higher standard in England and Wales in comparison with the Republic 
of Ireland. It is also demonstrated that the associated organisational arrangements in 
England and Wales have been more successful in tackling certain problematic 
drinking water quality parameters. The paper concludes by arguing that national 
governments, and their regulatory agencies, should view the rationalisation of 
organisations involved in the provision of drinking water as key to ensuring better 
drinking water quality. It is also suggested that state regulators who are responsible 
for ensuring the quality of drinking water end their dependency on water providers 
for quality data. They should instead become capable of directly monitoring drinking 
water quality via their own sampling regime. It is argued that this organisational 
arrangement would be representative of a more progressive and robust organisational 
approach to ensuring the supply of safe high quality drinking water.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper establishes the quality of drinking water in England and Wales and the 
Republic of Ireland
1
, and the organisational arrangements associated with it, for the 
period 1970 to 2002. The standards laid down by the Drinking Water Directive 
80/778/EEC are used to provide the analytical backdrop for evaluating the quality of 
drinking water. The quality of drinking water in England/Wales is shown to have been 
of a consistently higher standard than in comparison with Ireland, which is 
subsequently revealed as having developed less effective organisational arrangements 
for the delivery and regulation of drinking water quality. The paper also establishes 
the organisational provision of drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland to 
diverge in three broad areas; namely, with regard to the role of government in 
provision; the role of government in finance; and the role of government in regulation.  
 
 
To explore the quality of drinking water and the associated organisational 
arrangements in England/Wales and Ireland, this paper has been split into four main 
sections. The first section provides an overview of the methodology, the second 
                                                 
1
 To aid conciseness from this point onwards, England and Wales are referred to as England/Wales, 
and the Republic of Ireland is referred to as Ireland.  
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establishes the quality of drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland; the third 
details the associated organisational arrangements. The paper is then drawn to close 
with a discussion and conclusions section.  
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
To allow an investigation into the quality of drinking water and the associated 
organisational arrangements, and their impacts to take place, data was collected from 
reports and papers from parliamentary committees and proceedings, government 
departments, EU organisations and institutions, privately commissioned research, 
interviewee articles and conference presentations. The Times and Irish Times were 
also consulted to aid in the construction of a contemporary picture of the 
organisational set-up. The quality of drinking water was ascertained from analysis of 
published annual reports on the quality of drinking water. Interviewees were selected 
to represent the organisations and individuals associated with the supply and 
regulation of drinking water. Directive 80/778/EEC was used to guide the timeframe 
of this project, because of the central and fundamental role it has played in drinking 
water regulation in the European Union (Breach, 1989; CEC, 1980; Collins, 1988; 
Kramer, 2000; NSCA, 2000; Semple, 1993).  
 
In Ireland, a total of 19 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the 
Department of the Environment and Local Government (DOELG), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Individuals from the providers of water services were also 
selected for interview, which included Dublin City Council, Fingal County Council, 
Rathdown County Council, and South Dublin City Council. In England/Wales, a total 
of 33 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), and WaterVoice. Representatives of the 
providers of water services in the London area, namely Thames Water and Three 
Valleys Water, in addition to individuals from national representative groups such as 
Water UK, were also selected for interview. At the EU level a total of 12 individuals 
were interviewed, being drawn from the EC and the European Parliament (EP). 
Individuals were also selected for interview from the European Union of National 
Associations of Water Suppliers and Waste Water Services (EUREAU).   
 
The rationale for selecting individuals representative of the above organisations was 
fourfold. Firstly, officials from the Environment Commission were selected as 
representatives of the EU Commission with responsibility for water policy. The senior 
officials selected were in a good position to explain the organisational arrangements 
of Member States within the context of Directive 80/778/EEC (CEC, 1992; Weale et 
al., 2000). Secondly, senior representatives from relevant sections of the civil service 
in England/Wales and Ireland were selected to provide information on the 
organisational provision and regulation of drinking water in each country. Within 
each country, interviewees were selected to represent all the geographical tiers of 
government that are involved in supply and regulation of drinking water (CEC, 1992; 
OECD, 1994, 2000; Weale et al., 2000). Thirdly, representatives of water providers 
were chosen to provide information from the perspective of those with a day-to-day 
responsibility for drinking water. Information from such interviews was intended to 
cross-check views on the organisational arraignments put in place by national 
governments. Fourthly, interviews were conducted with senior representatives of 
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water providers in order to gain an overview of transposition and practical application 
responses from a wider national and supranational perspective.  
 
Individuals for interview were identified from articles in professional publications, in 
related academic research literature, and through direct liaison with individuals 
responsible for the regulation and delivery of drinking water. This ‘multiple entry’ 
approach was adopted for three key reasons: prevention of bias, minimising the 
chances of capture by an interview network, and to minimise the impact of disruptive, 
un-cooperative or unsuitable interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). A snowballing 
technique was employed when representatives of each key actor grouping were 
approached for the first time, so allowing an interview network to be constructed that 
was independent of previous research, while also enabling the researcher to seek new 
information and perspectives on organisational arrangements (Mason, 1998, Arksey 
and Knight, 1999, Patton, 2002).  
 
A numeric limit to sample size was not set at the beginning of the research. Instead 
interviews in England/Wales were curtailed when it was felt that new interviewees 
were not contributing new information and that regularities in accounts of 
processes/events had emerged (Guba, 1978). While this situation may lead to 
concerns associated with the reliability and robustness of findings when the sample 
size is small, this is a well tried and tested approach to research that is capable of 
pursuit with rigour (Minichiello et al., 1995, Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Patton, 2002). In 
regard to what is commonly known as ‘network closure’, Rubin and Rubin (1995: 72) 
make the following comment; ‘you keep adding interviewees until you understand 
[…] When each additional interviewee adds little to what you have already learned, 
you stop adding new interviewees’.  
 
By targeting the aforementioned interviewees different perspectives on organisational 
arrangements and outcomes were collated. This method of information collection, 
known as ‘triangulation’, as well as referring to using different sorts of data, enabled 
the trustworthiness and credibility of research findings to be enhanced. Triangulation 
facilitated insights that cast different views, so exposing inconsistencies and posing 
new questions that required reconciliation in order for understanding to be advanced 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Denzin, 1989; Flick, 2002). The triangulation of 
information was enhanced further by deriving data on the key themes in interviews 
from papers from Parliamentary committees and proceedings, reports from 
government departments, EU organisations and institutions, privately commissioned 
research, interviewee journal research articles and conference presentations. In 
addition to these sources of information, the Times and Independent newspapers in 
England/Wales, and the Irish Times in Ireland, were consulted for relevant articles on 
the Drinking Water Directive. By drawing upon such secondary sources of 
information, the process of data triangulation was extended. This process allowed the 
trustworthiness and credibility of the research findings to be further tested (Hoggart et 
al., 2002; Patton, 2002). Such sourcing of information further allowed information 
obtained from individuals to be confirmed and gaps in individual responses to be 
explored (Jick, 1983; Denzin, 1989; Arksey and Knight, 1999). However, there are 
concerns surrounding triangulation. In particular, Blaikie (1991) and Mason (1998) 
argue that one should take care when utilising information from different sources 
because such information can be based upon assumptions about differing issues rather 
than differing aspects of the same phenomena.  
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That said, where the research undertaken transcends a number of decades (as with this 
research), the memories of individuals whom it may be pertinent to interview may 
have become distorted and/or have become incomplete. For example, Roy Jenkins 
comments: 
‘If detailed work on the events of a period a number of decades 
ago is followed by the opportunity to talk to someone who was 
there at the time, the only too common result is that his [her] 
recollections, not only of the dates, but the sequence of events, do 
not fit the framework of the firmly established written fact’ 
(Quoted in Seldon, 1986: 6).  
Therefore, referral to secondary information helped clarify insights and lessen the 
prospect of inadequate recall leading to a questioning of the dependability of research 
findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Seldon, 1986). Secondary information also enables 
the ‘intrinsic bias that comes from single-methods, single-observer, and single-theory 
studies’ (Denzin, 1989: 307) to be overcome. In addition, Hodder (2000) suggests that 
written texts are useful in providing historical information that would not otherwise be 
forthcoming in spoken form.  
 
 
DRINKING WATER QUALITY AND THE DIRECTIVE 
To ascertain the quality of drinking water the following analysis has been split into 
two main sections. The first section focuses on water quality in England/Wales and 
Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s. The second section focuses on the quality of 
drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland between 1990 and 2002. This split 
represents the two periods before and after data on drinking water quality were 
coordinated and published nationally on an annual basis.  
 
Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland 1970 to 1989 
From 1970 to 1989, Ireland is notable for lacking nationally collated data on drinking 
water quality and exhibiting little public or media commentary on the quality of 
drinking water. This lack of data was commented on three years after Ireland was 
supposed to be compliant with standards in Directive 80/778/EEC. Hence, in 1988, an 
administrative circular issued by the Irish DOELG remarked that:  
 
‘The Department has relatively little information on the monitoring of toxic 
parameters […] insofar as drinking water is concerned’ (Circular L8/88 
DOELG [Ireland]: 1). 
 
Concern over contamination of surface and groundwater by organic and inorganic 
substances, like nitrate and pesticides, began to emerge in Ireland during the 1970s. 
Yet contamination was not believed to affect the quality of drinking water adversely 
(see Flanagan and Toner, 1972; IIRS, 1975; O’Donnell, 1980; Toner and Lennox, 
1980; Daly and Daly, 1984; Water Resources Division, 1986). A lack of commentary 
on drinking water quality in the debates of the Dáil Eireann (i.e. Parliament in 
Republic of Ireland) provides further confirmation of low levels of concern amongst 
Members of Parliament during the 1970s and 1980s. Where concern was identified, 
its appears to have been limited to one-off phenol contamination in North Dublin, 
which was not taken to be indicative of wider quality problems (see DE Debs., Vol. 
346, 22-11-83). Only toward the end of the 1980s did direct questions and data 
relating to the quality of drinking water begin to emerge, in particular with regard to 
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the level of nitrate contained in ground water (see DE Debs., Vol. 392, 02-11-89). It 
appears that during the 1970s and 1980 drinking water quality in Ireland was of little 
concern, or was perceived not be a concern. In a sense there are parallels here 
between Ireland and England/Wales, for in the latter the debate surrounding the 
quality of drinking water similarly focused on contamination by one or two 
substances. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, an emerging concern about contamination 
by lead and nitrate was identified (Pearce, 1982).  
 
In 1976, a UK survey on lead in drinking water revealed contamination to be far more 
widespread than previously thought (DoE, 1977; Atkinson, 1978). The report 
highlighted that while lead rarely occurs as a widespread natural contaminant, it tends 
to be present in drinking water due to the plumbosolvency of drinking water supplies 
(Nicolson, 1993). Prior to this survey, it was believed that only soft water dissolved 
lead from water pipes made from the metal. As a result of taking 2,600 samples, it 
was revealed that both soft and hard water had a plumbosolvency effect, and that the 
contamination of drinking water was more widespread that previously thought. 
During the course of the 1970s, concern also began to be attached to the level of 
nitrate in drinking water. In particular, nitrate contamination became of increased 
concern following the 1976 drought. This caused a sharp increase in concentrations in 
surface waters, with rising nitrate levels detected in groundwater in years following 
the drought. This caused suppliers of drinking water to consider other sources of 
groundwater supply (Atkinson, 1978). A further indicator of variable water quality 
was a 1984 government reply to a parliamentary enquiry on the number of suppliers 
breaching microbiological standards in Directive 80/778/EEC. It was reported that 90 
water supply areas, out of an unspecified number, were falling ‘marginally short of 
the EC drinking water directive’s microbiological standards at present’ (HC Debs., 
Vol. 84, 21-1-85, Col 551). The above information appears to indicate that problems 
relating to drinking water quality were isolated to a series of specific parameters and 
sources. However, the reported 1982 comments of Dr John Cuthbert, the then 
Director of the Water Research Centre’s Stevenage process engineering laboratories, 
appears to indicate a more dire picture. He reported to the National Water Council and 
to Government ministers that 50 per cent of all British water supplies failed to meet 
some part of the Directive (Pearce, 1982: 114).  
 
Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland 1990 to 2002 
This section presents the results of a comparative analysis of drinking water quality in 
England/Wales and Ireland for the period 1990 to 2002. It draws upon publicly 
available reports on drinking water quality. The starting point of 1990 represents the 
year data first become available in both national contexts. The end point of 2002 is the 
end point for data analysis as it represents the end of the data collection phase for this 
study. Overall compliance levels and levels for the individual standards relating to 
lead, nitrate, total coliforms, aluminium, iron, and pesticides are examined. As Figure 
1 illustrates, the overall quality drinking water quality is higher in England/Wales 
than in Ireland.  
 
Between 1990 and 2002, the percentage compliance ratings for drinking water quality 
in England/Wales and Ireland improved, with England/Wales exhibiting a 
consistently higher overall compliance. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the overall 
compliance in England/Wales increased from 98.82% to 99.85% (an increase of 
1.03%). While in Ireland it increased from 93.21% to 95.90% (an increase of 2.69%). 
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In both cases, the overall improvement was relatively small in percentage terms, yet 
overall compliance masks important and dramatic improvements in non-compliance 
failures for certain parameters.  
 
Figures 2 through 5 illustrate a pronounced rise in the percentage of tests in 
England/Wales meeting the Directive’s prescribed standards for nitrate, total 
coliforms, aluminium and iron. In particular, between 1990 to 2002, the percentage of 
tests not meeting the standard for nitrate fell from 0.77% to 0.11% (see Figure 2); for 
total coliforms it fell from 2.00% to 0.52% (see Figure 3); for aluminium from 0.90% 
to 0.07% (see Figure 4); and for iron from 3.00% to 0.83% (Figure 5).  
 
Page 7 of 23 
Figure 1. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland between 1990 and 
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(Source: DWI, 1991-2003; EPA, 1991-2003) 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The percentage rating for overall compliance was calculated in relation to parameters reported in 
annual reports. In the case of England/Wales, the parameters reported include: total coliforms; faecal 
coliforms; colour; turbidity; odour; taste; hydrogen ion; nitrate; nitrite; aluminium; iron; manganese; 
lead; PAH (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons); trihalomethanes; total pesticides (all pesticide sampled 
for); individual pesticides (e.g. simazine; atrazine; propyzamide); all others (refers to 38 other 
parameters regularly tested for but rarely found at non-compliant levels [e.g. copper; zinc; 
temperature]). In relation to Ireland, the parameters reported upon include: aluminium; ammonium; 
total and faecal coliforms; colour; fluoride; heavy metals (e.g. copper, zinc, cadmium; lead); iron; 
manganese; nitrate; nitrite; odour; taste; pH; trihalomethanes; turbidity; cryptosporidium (EPA, 2003).  
3
 It is acknowledged that use of a linear trend line is not ideal for 13 observations. The line has only 
been used to highlight the overall trend in the data presented.  
4
 In 2002 the EPA decided to discontinue calculating an overall compliance rating for drinking water 
quality in relation to the parameters detailed in footnote 10 (EPA, 2003). Discussion by the EPA of 
parameters would either make sole reference to the overall percentage compliance rating for a 
parameter, or break it down with regard to group and public water schemes. No data were then 
provided on the number of samples passed or failed in group and/or public water schemes. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to calculate overall compliance because the number of samples analysed 
in group and public water schemes is not known.  
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Figure 2. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to nitrates, 
1990-2002 
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Figure 3. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to total 
coliforms, 1990-2002 
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Figure 4. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to 
aluminium, 1990-2002 
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Figure 5. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to iron, 
1990-2002 
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As noted previously, Figure 1 reveals clearly that Ireland has achieved a consistently 
lower overall compliance rating for drinking water quality, when compared to 
England/Wales. The annual drinking water reports, and the action plans for rural 
drinking water in Ireland, highlight that the overall quality of drinking water is 
lowered due to the poorer quality of water produced by group water schemes. In the 
context of Ireland, group water schemes refer to drinking water distributed by 
privately owned schemes that source and distributes their own supplies of drinking 
water (NFGWS, 2003). According to the Irish Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), group water schemes supply water of a lower quality because of 
contamination with animal and human waste and a lack of chlorination (EPA, 1999). 
 
Assessing the effect of group water schemes on the overall quality of drinking water 
in Ireland has proved difficult, as annual reports have not always broken down quality 
data by group and public water schemes. As Figure 6 illustrates, the data available 
only allows assessment of overall quality supplied in relation to group and public 
water schemes back to 2000. What is notable is that drinking water from both group 
and public water supplies in Ireland is of a lower quality than in England/Wales (see 
Figure 6), suggesting that while group water schemes have had a negative impact on 
the overall result for drinking water quality in Ireland, their presence does not account 
for differences across the two national contexts.   
 
Figure 6. Overall drinking water compliance in relation to public and group water 
schemes in Ireland, 2000-2002 
 
(Source: DWI, 2001-2003; EPA, 2001-2003) 
 
 
9
5
.7
 
9
6
 9
7
.4
 
9
1
.2
 
8
9
.5
 
9
1
.5
 
9
4
.2
9
 
9
4
.2
9
 
9
5
.9
 
9
9
.8
 
9
9
.8
3
 
9
9
.8
5
 
84 
86 
88 
90 
92 
94 
96 
98 
100 
102 
2000 2001 2002 
Year 
%
 o
f 
co
m
p
li
an
t 
te
st
s 
Public Water Schemes (Ireland) Group Water Schemes (Ireland) 
Average Compliance (Ireland) Average Compliance (England/Wales) 
Page 11 of 23 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
To enable the organisational arrangements of England/Wales and Ireland to be 
established and discussed, the following discussion is split in two. The first section 
covers the organisational arrangements in Ireland to water services with the second 
section detailing the organisational arrangements in England/Wales from 1973 to 
2002. 
 
Drinking water provision in Ireland 
Between 1973 and 2002, drinking water provision in Ireland was the responsibility of 
88 local authorities
5
 and a growing number of group water schemes (European 
Communities [Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption] Regulations, 
1988). The delivery of water services is currently the responsibility of 88 local 
authorities, which supply approximately 90% of the population, and approximately 
5,500 group water schemes, which supply approximately 10% of the population 
(EPA, 2003; EPA, 2005; Oasis, 2006; Scannell, 1995; 2005). Despite their 
‘independence’, the group water schemes are under the statutory management of the 
local authorities who are responsible for monitoring and enforcing the quality 
standards contained within the Directive. Local authorities are then overseen by the 
Irish Department of the Environment (DOELG), who are responsible for Directive 
80/778/EEC (Scannell, 1976; 1982; Quinn, 1992; Coyle, 1994; McGowan, 1999; 
OECD 2000; Taylor, 2001; NFGWS, 2003; 2004). 
 
Following the 1988 European Communities (Quality of Water Intended for Human 
Consumption) Regulations, the Environmental Research Unit of the Irish environment 
department began to produce an annual, publicly available, report on drinking water 
quality. Prior to 1988, the enforcement of drinking water quality regulations rested 
with the local authorities themselves (Coyle, 1994; Scanell, 1995; Taylor, 2001). In 
1993, this responsibility passed to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA 
Act 1992). In addition to monitoring and reporting on the quality of drinking water, 
the EPA is also responsible for monitoring and reporting on the quality of the wider 
water environment, and enforcing regulations with regard to waste and air pollution. 
The EPA is reliant upon water providers for data on the quality of drinking water 
(EPA, 2003b).  
 
Between 1973 and 2002, the funding of water services underwent a series of notable 
changes in Ireland. Prior to 1978, water services provided by local authorities were 
funded via a mix of central government grants and revenue generated by domestic 
rates, which included a charge for water services (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 
1993). In relation to private group water schemes, users pay a subsidised rate for the 
services that are provided, with local authorities subsidising such schemes with the 
aid of central government grants (Collins and Cradden, 1993). However, domestic 
rates for water services, and thus the contribution of domestic users to the cost of 
water services in urban areas, were abolished
6
 in 1978. To replace the loss in revenue, 
central government allocated an increased grant to local authorities in the form of a 
domestic rate grant (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 1993).  However, in 1982-
1983 central government stopped making up this financial shortfall by decoupling the 
domestic rate grant from the locally determined domestic rates. This situation allowed 
                                                 
5
 Also known as public water scheme providers. 
6
 County councils in rural areas retained the right to charge for domestic water supplies until 1997. 
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the Treasury increasingly to determine what was spent at the local level (see Ridge, 
1992).  
 
In 1982, an Irish government circular enabled local authorities once again to charge 
for water services (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 1993). In the context of a 
national fiscal crisis, the central government announced a decrease of eight per cent in 
the central grant levels to local authorities. Yet local authorities were allowed to 
mitigate the effects of this decrease somewhat by levying specific charges for the 
services they provided, such as water; although the national government did restrict 
the amount that local authorities could spend on local services, so as to manage the 
national fiscal crisis. As a consequence, expenditure on water services fell (see Ridge, 
1992; Taylor, 1998, 2001). This decrease occurred because the national government 
sought to bring about economic stability by reducing inflation via a reduction in 
expenditure on public services (see Collins and Cradden, 1993; Coakley and 
Gallagher, 1999).  
  
In response to their newly acquired revenue raising authority, by 1996 all but two 
local councils in Ireland (Dublin and Limerick) had developed some form of charging 
for water services, via the development and specification of an actual charge for water 
services in the annual rates bills sent to domestic householders (Collins and Cradden 
1997). Despite the calculation and specification of charges for water services, in 1997 
domestic user charges were once again discontinued, even though the direct billing 
and metering of business users has become increasingly commonplace (OECD, 2000; 
DOELG, 2004). Serving to complicate the funding of water services in Ireland 
further, group water schemes that are supplied with drinking water by local authorities 
also had their service charges abolished in 1997. However, users of private group 
water schemes still have to pay, albeit they are subsided by the relevant local 
authority. As consequence of the above changes, the DOELG has become responsible 
for financing the provision of water services via revenue generated from income tax. 
For the period 1994 to 1999, EU cohesion and structural funding also contributed to 
the funding of water services in Ireland, with this funding substantially decreasing 
between 2000 and 2006. This decrease occurred because of Ireland’s improving 
financial situation relative to the rest of the EU (DOELG, 2002; 2004; Oasis, 2006).  
 
Drinking water provision in England/Wales 
For the period 1973 to 1988, water services in England/Wales were delegated to 
Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) and Statutory Water Companies.7 The RWAs 
were responsible for the delivery and regulation of sewerage and drinking water 
services. They were created as a result of the 1973 Water Act (Severn Trent Water 
Authority, 1980; Hassan, 1996; Summerton, 1998, Richardson, 2002), which brought 
about a marked rationalisation and regionalisation of water services in England/Wales 
(Parker and Sewell, 1988; Hassan, 1996). Prior to 1973, 157 water undertakings, 29 
river authorities and 1,398 sanitary authorities existed in England/Wales. As a 
consequence of the 1973 Water Act, the responsibilities and functions of these various 
bodies were transferred to just 10 RWAs (Parker and Sewell, 1988; Hassan, 1996).  
 
                                                 
7
 The term statutory water company refers to companies that were established via a UK Act of 
Parliament to provide drinking water only. 
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This rationalisation shifted control of water resources away from the above authorities 
to large multi-regional service and regulatory management bodies (Hassan, 1996; 
Summerton, 1998). These RWAs took the form of nationalised industries in an 
organisational and constitutional sense. For instance, they were managed by a board 
appointed jointly by Ministers and local authorities (Summerton, 1998). Although 
each authority was legally distinct from central government and could determine their 
own spending priorities, Ministers were able to ‘constrain’ the actions of RWAs via 
the issuing of general and special directions, and the imposition of cash limits on new 
capital investment (Summerton, 1998). According to Saunders (1985), further 
government attempts to improve the efficiency of RWAs were driven by a belief that 
greater central bureaucratic control of public services was best able to help Britain 
respond to a period of economic decline and readjustment.  
 
In 1989, the delivery of water services in England/Wales underwent major reform, 
passing entirely into the hands of the private sector as a consequence of the 1989 
Water Act. The ten RWAs, created as a result of the 1973 Water Act, were floated on 
the London Stock Exchange (OECD, 1994, van den Berg, 1997; Richardson, 2002). 
In addition, 29 statutory water supply-only companies were allowed to float 
themselves on the stock market, if they so desired. As a consequence, a series of water 
company mergers took place, resulting in 19 statutory water companies by 1996 
(OECD, 1994; Richardson, 2002)8. Currently, the privatised water industry is 
responsible for supplying approximately 99% of all drinking water in England/Wales 
(DWI, 2003)9. 
 
In England/Wales, Section 60 of the 1989 Water Act empowered Secretaries of State 
for the Environment to appoint technical assessors to act on their behalf in the 
assessment and regulation of drinking water quality. Prior to this Act, the DoE was 
itself responsible for monitoring the quality of drinking water at the national level. 
This was done through sampling data supplied to it by the providers of water services, 
who were also responsible for the enforcement of drinking water quality standards. As 
a consequence of the 1989 Water Act, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) was 
established and charged with the task of monitoring and reporting on the safety of 
drinking water (DWI, 2004: 1). 
 
Between 1970 and 1988, water services in England/Wales were funded via a changing 
mixture of charging of water users in relation to the rateable property value, RWA 
cross subsidisation, and funding from the Treasury (Parker and Sewell, 1988; WAA, 
1988; Summerton, 1998). Following the reorganisation of the water industry by the 
1973 Water Act, the Rate Support Grant from central government was removed. This 
meant that, for the first time, consumers began to pay more realistic water supply 
costs, albeit varying slightly due to the historic debts the RWAs had inherited (Parker 
and Sewell, 1988). Domestic customers were charged for water services according to 
the ‘rateable value’ of their properties, which continues to this day, with water 
charging still loosely related to rateable value (Parker and Sewell, 1988). Central to 
                                                 
8
 The duties of the water service companies and the water only companies are the same with regards to 
drinking water (Water Act [England], 1989). 
9
 Approximately 1% of the population in England/Wales has its water needs met via private water 
supplies. The source of such supplies can include water drawn from a well, borehole, spring, stream, 
river, lake or pond (DWI, 2000).  
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this funding arrangement is the ability of government to control expenditure and 
borrowing within the water industry, with both subject to the external finance limits: 
 
‘(the) external finance limit (EFL) is the amount the authority can raise 
from external sources. The overall limit for the industry is allocated as 
part of the Governments public sector borrowing requirement’ (WAA, 
1988: 27) 
In England/Wales, as a consequence of privatisation, the Government no longer 
considers the financing of the water industry to be part of the public sector borrowing 
requirement (Hassan, 1995; Bakker, 2005). This has paved the way for the 
application of ‘direct cost’ recovery with regard to the delivery of water services10. To 
oversee the effective application and functioning of economic principles in a 
monopoly dominated market place, and in similarity with previous network utility 
privatisations, government established the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) was in 
1989 to act as an economic regulator (Bakker, 2001; Ofwat 2004).  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To enable the findings of this study to be summarised and appropriate conclusions 
drawn about drinking water quality and associated organisational arrangements in 
England/Wales and Ireland, this section has been split in two. The first section 
summarises the study’s finding with regard to water quality. The second section 
discusses the key organisational differences in relation to the provision of drinking 
water and its regulation.  
 
Drinking water quality. This paper has established that the quality of drinking water 
in England/Wales and Ireland to have been a problem of growing concern in the 
1970s and 1980s. In England/Wales, available historical data indicates the role of 
government-sponsored research in helping establish the extent of drinking water 
quality problems. However, in Ireland there was little public reporting and concern 
over the quality of drinking water. From the data identified, major problems relating 
to drinking water revolved around contamination by lead and nitrate, particularly in 
England/Wales. In Ireland, this issue was particularly poorly documented. While 
reports highlighted a growing risk of contamination by nitrate, there were no specific 
reports on the contamination of drinking water, as occurred in England/Wales.  
 
Between 1990 and 2002, the drinking water quality data contained in the annual 
national monitoring reports for England/Wales and Ireland demonstrates 
England/Wales to have obtained a higher overall level of compliance with standards 
laid down by Directive 80/778/EEC. The data also served to show that England/Wales 
have managed to bring about far more significant improvements in drinking water 
quality with regards to particular parameters. Within Ireland, group water schemes 
have been found to have a significant impact on the overall quality of drinking water 
nationally, as their compliance record is poorer than that for public schemes.  
However, it is of note that these water schemes do not account sufficiently for 
Ireland’s lower overall compliance rating and higher compliance failures with 
                                                 
10
 Direct, within the context of this thesis, serves to imply that consumers of drinking water are directly 
billed for the full cost of the volume of water services they consume. 
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‘problem parameters’. Both public and group water schemes demonstrate higher 
failure rates in comparison with England/Wales.  
 
Organisational arrangements. The provision of drinking water in England/Wales and 
Ireland diverges in three broad areas; namely, with regard to the role of government in 
provision; the role of government in finance; and the role of government in regulation. 
The role of national level government has been chosen to highlight differing 
organisational arrangements as they are ultimately responsible for ensuring 
compliance with European water quality standards. In particular, national 
governments, not the providers of water services, are subject to non-compliance 
proceedings by the European Commission. Consequently, they provide a suitable 
focal point for highlighting differences as they have to develop organisational 
arrangements to ensure the quality standards of Directive 80/778/EEC are met.  
 
Firstly, they differ with regard to the role government has come to play in the 
provision of drinking water. In Ireland, the national government has remained 
responsible for the delivery of drinking water via local authorities (in the main), and, 
to a not insignificant extent, through group water schemes. In contrast, since 1989, 
drinking water supply has been the responsibility of the private sector in 
England/Wales. This aside, the provision of drinking water in Ireland is significantly 
more fragmented than in England/Wales. So, while only 29 companies are responsible 
for the provision of drinking water to a population of some 60 million in 
England/Wales, in Ireland drinking water is supplied to a population of just 3.9 
million by some 88 local authorities and approximately 5,500 group water schemes. 
Industry and government officials in Ireland note that the organisational 
fragmentation of drinking water caused by group water schemes has hindered 
achievement of the Directive’s quality standards. This is due to the operators of such 
schemes lacking an awareness of current treatment techniques and to the limited funds 
government was able and willing to allocate to tackling problems of non-compliance 
by such schemes. Arguably, the heightened level of organisational fragmentation is 
also serving to prevent economies of scale being achieved with regard to the 
dissemination and sharing of technical and financial resources, which is crucial to the 
achievement of the Directive’s standards. Indeed, it might very well be the case that 
such fragmentation is also serving to prevent the ‘blending’ of drinking water sources. 
This technique has, arguably, been made ever more possible by the high level of 
organisational rationalisation in England/Wales. This rationalisation has potentially 
allowed water companies to bring under their control and thus utilise a wider array of 
drinking water sources. As a result, they have been able to better meet the quality 
standards of Directive 80/778/EEC because they have been able to mix a wider array 
of drinking water sources to dilute potentially harmful substances to legally compliant 
levels.  
 
The second key difference concerns the financing of drinking water supply by 
national government. Since 1989, water services in England/Wales have been subject 
to the principle of full cost recovery via application of the user pays principle for all 
users, meaning that the consumer pays the full costs associated with receiving 
services. By contrast, since 1997, the Irish state has stopped charging domestic 
consumers for water services. Ireland has instead preferred to finance the provision of 
water services via general taxation. Therefore, it can be argued that the actions of 
government in England/Wales have allowed the provision of water services, for 
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example drinking water, to be treated more as a commodity in comparison to Ireland. 
In Ireland, the removal of domestic charges has prevented the commodification of 
domestic water services because such consumers do not pay for what they use or are 
perceived as using. 
 
Water services in Ireland have been the recipient of substantial EU funding since the 
early 1990s. This contrasts markedly with the provision of water services in 
England/Wales, which have been entirely financed by the consumers of water services 
(overseen by Ofwat, a non-departmental, state sponsored economic regulator). 
Despite these differences in funding arrangements, both countries, since 1990, have 
witnessed increased investment in water services. Also, as highlighted by Figure 1, 
drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland has, since 1990, become increasingly 
compliant with the quality standards of the Directive. In both national contexts, when 
the water industry was under the ownership of national government during the 1970s 
and 1980s, public expenditure on water services decreased as a consequence of 
government limiting public expenditure. This was part of a wider government 
economic strategy to control inflation and restore economic stability. This had a 
detrimental impact upon the ability of water providers to meet the quality standards of 
Directive 80/778/EEC. Awareness of such government actions is useful in helping to 
explain why the water industry in England/Wales and Ireland did not appear to take 
more pride in producing and providing cleaner drinking water, even when they knew 
problems existed. While this finding appears to suggest that drinking water quality is 
directly related to funding levels, the author acknowledges that any such relationship 
is far from linear.  Improvements in drinking water quality are also dependent upon a 
series of others factors, such as regulatory arrangements, as this paper has shown. 
However, it is notable that many interviewees and senior water practitioners have 
commented on the role played by adequate levels of finance in helping the water 
industry to effectively meet its regulatory obligations, none more so than the quality 
standards laid down by Directive 80/778/EEC (see Summerton, 1998; Richardson, 
2002; Jenkins, in press). 
 
The final key difference is related to the role played by national government in 
enforcing the Directive’s standards. Since 1989 the enforcement of the Directive’s 
standards in England/Wales has been the principal responsibility of the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate (DWI), a state sponsored regulatory agency. Lagging some four 
years behind England/Wales, the Irish Government established the EPA with the task 
of monitoring the quality of drinking water. Both these agencies produce annual 
reports on drinking water quality based upon sample data supplied by the providers of 
water services. Arguably, this interdependency is a weakness as it allows for the 
possibility of misreporting in an attempt to avoid the unwanted attention of the 
regulator. While, to the knowledge of the author, this situation has not occurred, it is 
notable that in the early days of privatisation water companies in England/Wales were 
criticised for failing to submit drinking water quality data to the regulator (see DWI, 
1990, 1991). Indeed, some of the water providers in Ireland have also been criticised 
on similar grounds (see EPA, 1990, 1991). While it seems inconceivable that the 
providers of drinking water would seek to the put the health of the public at risk by 
misreporting drinking water quality data, it is notable that water companies in 
England/Wales have been fined for misreporting consumer complaints and have 
subsequently been fined for doing so. Therefore, an independent monitoring agency, 
capable of directly monitoring drinking water quality via its own sampling regime, 
Page 17 of 23 
would appear to be a more progressive and robust organisational approach to ensuring 
the supply of  safe high quality drinking water. The extent to which any such body 
should be created at the European level is largely a matter of politics, but independent 
drinking water regulatory organisations should be viewed as a step in right direction 
in helping to improve the implementation of current and future European drinking 
water directives. 
 
In England/Wales, the DWI is responsible for regulating the compliance of privately 
owned water providers with the standards of the Directive, whereas in Ireland the 
EPA is responsible for regulating compliance by government-owned and funded 
providers of water services, notably local authorities. In relation to any effect this has 
had on the impetus to achieve the quality standards of the Directive, the DWI in 
England/Wales has been found to have brought legal proceedings against water 
providers if they fail to meet the quality standards of the Directive. For example, in 
January 2002, Yorkshire Water was fined a total of £23,261 following legal 
proceedings brought by the DWI for failing to supply water fit for human 
consumption (DWI, 2002b). Such prosecutions aim to encourage the providers of 
drinking water in England/Wales to meet the quality standards of the Directive. In 
contrast, the EPA in Ireland has not prosecuted local authorities for failing to achieve 
the quality standards of the Directive. This reluctance has been found to be associated 
with water providers in Ireland making significantly weaker progress in meeting the 
quality standards of the Directive. When EPA employees were asked why the EPA 
had not brought any legal proceedings against local authorities who breached the 
Directive’s standards, they argued that such enforcement action was not conducive to 
maintaining a good working relationship with local authorities. In effect, the EPA was 
unlikely to prosecute because such action would result in one section of government 
publicly criticising another, which was to be avoided. As to what extent this appears 
to be indicative of the Irish government ultimately sanctioning the breaching of the 
Directive’s standards is largely a matter of public and party politics. As forthcoming 
research by the author has found (see Jenkins, in press), a political will for change has 
to exist, without such ‘will’ the political priority accorded drinking water quality will 
remain low in comparison with other issues, such as stimulating economic growth and 
balancing the public finances. Therefore, the above situation draws attention to a 
fundamental difference in the regulatory approach to how the standards of the 
Directive are enforced. In particular, the willingness of the DWI, in England/Wales, to 
bring legal proceedings to enforce the standards of the Directive is indicative of a 
more fixed and legal approach to the regulation of drinking water, that is in turn more 
removed from the political priorities of national government. Whereas in Ireland, the 
approach of the EPA towards regulatory enforcement appears to be more flexible and 
less legalistic, due to the unwillingness of the EPA to take enforcement actions 
against the providers of drinking water, with this due to government involvement in 
all stages of water supply and its regulation. 
 
In conclusion, and with regard to the future provision of drinking water, it is 
suggested that where countries are failing to bring about improvements in drinking 
water quality, they should seek to reduce the number of organisations involved in the 
provision of drinking water. This response should help to ensure better quality control 
as it will help create larger organisations that should be better able to more readily 
achieve economies of scale that enable technical and financial solutions to be more 
readily embraced. This paper has clearly shown that markedly rationalised 
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organisational arrangements appear to be associated with higher and more consistent 
levels of drinking water quality. It is of note that the markedly rationalised system of 
England/Wales has been accompanied by a regulatory system that is more legalistic 
and dependent on the private sector, with the willingness to prosecute being 
associated with an ability to more effectively tackle drinking water quality problems. 
Therefore, any such organisational rationalisation should also be accompanied by a 
more legalistic system of enforcement. The findings of this paper should not be 
ignored by national governments and their regulatory agencies. While the approach of 
England/Wales appears to have had a positive impact on the quality of drinking water, 
the author duly acknowledges that other so called ‘steering tools’ like; bench marking, 
naming and shaming, or indeed complimenting the providers of drinking water, have 
their role to play in creating effective organisations that are capable of delivering safe 
high quality drinking water.  
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